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ABSTRACT: This paper is an empirical sequel to our previous theoretical analysis of 
the relationship between tax decentralisation and economic growth. Taking such 
theoretical work as a point of departure, we ask whether the process of revenue 
decentralisation from central to regional governments experienced by the Spanish 
economy during the period 1984-1995 supports our main findings. In addition, 
following recent analytical considerations for fiscal decentralisation measurement three 
different revenue decentralisation indicators for the Spanish case are proposed. 
According with the results, we might conclude that revenue control decentralisation to 
regional levels of government in Spain has generated a positive effect on regional 
economic growth during the period considered. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Studies of the possible relationship between fiscal decentralisation processes and 
economic growth opened up a new line of research in the latter half of the 1990’s. This 
was built upon a much wider academic foundation, concerned with the relationships 
between fiscal decentralisation and a series of economic and political goals, and based 
on the seminal work of Tiebout (1956), Stigler (1957), Musgrave (1959) and Oates 
(1972). In addition to economic growth per se, these goals included public spending 
efficiency, horizontal fiscal equity, controlling the size of government, macroeconomic 
stability, creating appropriate conditions for governments and markets to operate 
effectively and the reduction of poverty. 
 
The main spur to the development of this new line of research has been the 
process of devolution of power from central to lower tiers of government, a trend 
occurring mainly in transitional and developing economies, with the encouragement of 
various international bodies, particularly the World Bank. The intuition that these 
processes might not only affect the efficiency of public spending, horizontal fiscal 
equity and macroeconomic stability, comprising what might be called the traditional 
effects, but could also influence economic growth, has led researchers at this and other 
international institutions to analyse this possible relationship. 
 
The emergence (or re-emergence) of debate on the subject of fiscal 
decentralisation in numerous developed economies in recent decades has, meanwhile, 
encouraged academic interest in this line of research. Consequently, the process is 
central to the study of such economies, with research focusing on the possible 
relationship to economic growth, one of the principal current academic concerns. 
 
A detailed review of the state of research into the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth is contained in Martínez-Vázquez and McNab 
(2003), who draw attention to the paucity of empirical work in this area, which contrasts 
sharply with the profusion of informal literature on the economic consequences of fiscal 
decentralisation. They also draw a clear distinction between the direct and indirect 
relationships which fiscal decentralisation and economic growth display. 
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The direct relationship is clearly described in Oates (1993)
1, who transposes his 
basic proposition concerning the positive impact of fiscal decentralisation on economic 
efficiency to the dynamic sphere of economic growth (without supplying a formal 
analysis, however). The economic efficiency proposition was developed within a static 
framework in Oates’ (1972) Decentralisation Theorem, and was further reinforced by 
the population mobility arguments propounded in Tiebout (1956); it is argued that 
regional and national economic growth could be increased if decisions concerning 
investment in different types of capital were taken by lower tiers of government, 
because of the greater local knowledge, political accountability and transparency 
existing at these levels. 
 
With some exceptions, Oates’ argument has been accepted as the starting point 
for the empirical and theoretical research, undertaken from the mid-1990s to date, which 
analyses the possible effects of fiscal decentralisation upon economic growth. Such 
studies include eminently empirical work aimed at quantifying these effects; some 
examples are Woller and Phillips (1998), Zhang and Zou (1998), Lin and Liu (2000), 
Yilmaz (2000), Thiessen (2000 and 2003), Akai and Sakata (2002), Desai et al. (2003), 
Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004), Iimi (2005) and Jin and Zou (2005). Other papers 
attempt not only to quantify the such effects, but also to construct a simple analytical 
model reflecting the relationship existing between the two processes; see, from among 
the literature, Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xie et al. (1999), Zhang and Zou (2001), and 
Martínez-Vázquez and McNab (2002). Finally, the work of Zou (1996), Brueckner 
(1999 and 2005) and Gong and Zou (2002 and 2003), focuses exclusively, and therefore 
in greater detail, on the construction of the relevant analytic framework. 
 
However, the results obtained by this series of studies are not conclusive. The 
various theoretical models developed regarding the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth usually offer, as their result, the existence of 
optimal levels of fiscal decentralisation (maximisers of economic growth) in excess of 
which the effects of decentralisation upon growth become negative. Such is the case of, 
among others, Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xie et al. (1999) and Zhang and Zou (2001); 
                                                 
1 However, other researchers into fiscal federalism also describe its influence upon economic growth. See, 
for example, Bahl and Linn (1992), Rivlin (1992), Bird (1993) and Gramlich (1993). 
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some cases, fiscal decentralisation is not significant -Woller y Phillips (1998)- while in 
others, when it is indeed significant and a test is performed of the potential non-linear 
relationship between decentralisation and growth, the coefficient estimated is not 
significant -Martínez-Vázquez and McNab (2002). 
 
Furthermore, when a significant relationship is estimated between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth, highly disparate results are obtained. Thus, when 
analysing this relationship for a group of countries with developed or developing 
economies, a positive effect of the decentralisation of expenditure upon economic 
growth is observable -Yilmaz (2000) and Iimi (2005)-, which remains positive when the 
analysis is performed only for a set of economically developed countries -Thiessen 
(2003)-, but which becomes negative when the sample comprises developing countries -
Davoodi and Zou (1998)
2. By contrast, research focused on one specific economy 
obtains a negative effect of the decentralisation of expenditure upon the economic 
growth of Germany in the four decades following the Second World War -Behnisch et 
al. (2002)-, and a positive effect of the decentralisation of expenditure, implemented in 
China from the 1980s onwards, upon economic expansion in the Chinese regions, -Jin et 
al., (1999) and Qiao et al. (2002). In the case of the USA, a positive effect of 
expenditure decentralisation upon the economic growth of the constituent states also 
seems to have taken place in the first half of the 1990s -Akai and Sakata (2002). When a 
specific analysis is undertaken of the relationship between the decentralisation of 
revenue and economic growth, for groups of countries, no significant effect is obtained -
Fukasaku and de Mello (1998)-, even when a distinction is made between developing 
economies -Woller and Phillips (1998)- and developed economies -Thiessen (2003). 
While for cases of individual countries a positive effect of decentralisation of revenue 
upon growth in Chinese regions is obtained -Lin and Liu (2000)-, in that of the Indian 
states -Zhang and Zou (2001)- and upon the recovery of industrial production of the 
Russian regions -Desai et al. (2003). 
 
                                                 
2 This result supports the reasoning of Bahl and Linn (1992), which refers to the necessity of exceeding a 
certain threshold of development in order for fiscal decentralisation to provide positive effects upon 
economic growth. 
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the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth may be due to the 
differing economic or time scenarios analysed in each case, but may also be affected by 
certain methodological problems, such as the correct specification of the equation to be 
estimated or the fiscal decentralisation indicators employed, according to Martínez-
Vázquez and McNab (2003). Specifically, the fiscal decentralisation indicators which 
are normally utilised are the subcentral/total ratios of expenditure and revenue, 
compiled using data from the Government Financial Statistics (GFS) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or national statistical institutes. These indicators, 
although highly operative, in many cases do not provide adequate information regarding 
the degree of autonomy with respect to central control which such fiscal decentralisation 
represents for subcentral governments. That is to say, in line with Rodden (2004), they 
do not reflect the basis of the majority of the theoretical arguments which refer to the 
advantages produced by a process of fiscal decentralisation. This is, for example, the 
case of Oates (1993), when he proposes the fulfilment of his Decentralisation Theory of 
1972 within the dynamic context of economic growth. 
 
Recently, in response to this situation, several studies have been published -Ebel 
and Yilmaz (2002), Meloche et al. (2004) and Stegarescu (2005)- which, without 
abandoning the quantitative nature of the indicators, have proposed a more diligent 
employment of the data available for a series of countries. The essential idea is that it is 
important to take into account not only the volume of decentralised resources, but also 
the degree of control which subcentral governments exert over them; consequently, an 
important element of the theory of fiscal federalism would be captured and, as a result, 
the empirical analysis of decentralisation processes would become more accurate. 
 
Moreover, as we have indicated in Gil-Serrate and López-Laborda (2005)
3, 
within the literature concerning the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth, there can be discerned a greater interest in the analysis of that 
relationship with regard to the decentralisation of expenditure than with regard to the 
decentralisation of revenue, from not only the theoretical but also the empirical point of 
view. Consequently, we believe it is important to further the study of the relationship 
                                                 
3 A preliminary version of this study was presented to the 44
th Congress of the European Regional 
Science Association held in Oporto, Portugal, in 2004. 
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proposed a theoretical link between a process of fiscal decentralisation taking place in a 
typical region and balanced per capita regional income in the long term in the study 
cited immediately above, we now turn to the empirical analysis of the relationship 
which may exist between the decentralisation of revenue and regional economic growth. 
 
We shall perform this analysis for the case of Spanish regions and the period 
1984-1995, employing the econometric approach of panel data. In order to do this we 
employ the theoretical model presented in Gil-Serrate and López-Laborda (2005), not in 
order to directly estimate it but rather to take into account the principal results obtained: 
 
1.  That for any level of decentralisation of expenditure, a greater 
decentralisation of revenue may positively affect economic growth. 
2.  That there exists, in certain circumstances, a relationship between a 
low productivity of public investment and a positive effect of the 
decentralisation of revenue upon economic growth, a relationship 
which would be channelled through private investment, as a 
consequence of the "flypaper effect". 
 
Considering these results, in line with Martínez-Vázquez and McNab (2003), 
leads us to analyse not only the possible direct relationship between the decentralisation 
of revenue and regional economic growth, but also the indirect relationship which may 
exist between the two processes, via private investment. On this point, we agree with 
the (limited) previous studies which, analysing the indirect nature of such a relationship, 
have taken into account the possible effects that fiscal decentralisation may have upon 
those determinants of economic growth most widely recognised by the relevant 
literature, e.g. the work of Thiessen (2000 and 2003), with regard to investment and 
total factor productivity (TFP), and that of Martínez-Vázquez and McNab (2002), 
concerning macroeconomic stability, as represented by the rate of inflation. 
 
In addition, on the basis of the idea (expressed above) that when constructing a 
fiscal decentralisation indicator it is necessary to take into account the degree of control 
which regional governments have over decentralised resources, we shall propose three 
indicators of decentralisation for the case of the decentralisation process which has 
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study of the potential relationship between the decentralisation of revenue and the 
economic growth of the Spanish regions.   
 
Both the employment of revenue decentralisation indicators which reflect the 
differing degrees of control regional governments have upon that revenue and the 
demonstration of a possible indirect relationship between revenue decentralisation and 
economic growth, in the context of Spanish regions or Autonomous Communities 
(ACs), make important contributions to the scanty literature which exists regarding the 
empirical testing of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth in Spanish regions. The two studies which have so far explored this relationship 
have estimated, firstly, direct positive and significant effects of the decentralisation of 
expenditure and revenue in the growth of the ACs for the period 1991-1996 (Carrión-i-
Silvestre et al.,2004) and, secondly, a non-significant direct relationship between the 
decentralisation of expenditure and revenue and the economic growth of the ACs, for a 
time period (1992-1999) very similar to that analysed in the previous study (Pérez and 
Cantarero, 2004). The use of such short time periods and the disparity of results makes 
it difficult to draw a conclusion regarding the existence and sign of the relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth in Spanish regions.  
 
The current study, of a slightly longer period (1984-1995), which tests the 
existence of a direct relationship between the decentralisation of revenue and the 
economic growth of Spanish regions, finds almost no evidence of such a link. It is also 
apparent that, if this relationship did in fact exist, the degree of control exerted by 
regional governments upon decentralised revenue would not play a significant role 
therein. Nevertheless, we do find a positive (indirect) effect of the decentralisation of 
revenue upon regional economic growth, through the positive influence of the former 
upon private (sector) investment, which in turn positively affects economic growth; 
with regard to this effect, the degree of control which regional governments have over 
their revenue is important. 
 
Thus, the current study is structured as follows: in the first section we propose a 
set of indicators for the decentralisation of revenue, in the context of the process of 
Spanish fiscal decentralisation, which take into account the degree of control which 
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econometric specification and the variables, which we shall use to test the relationship 
between the decentralisation of revenue and economic growth in Spanish ACs. The 
third section is concerned with econometric questions which are important for the 
performance of this test, and includes a discussion and interpretation of the principal 
results obtained; it also considers the empirical testing of the possible indirect 
relationship between the decentralisation of revenue and regional economic growth 
through private investment. The final section presents the principal conclusions reached 
by the study. 
 
2.  PROPOSAL OF A SERIES OF INDICATORS OF REVENUE 
DECENTRALISATION FOR THE CASE OF THE SPANISH AUTONOMOUS 
COMMUNITIES 
 
In order to indicate the level of fiscal control which Spanish regional 
governments have over their revenue (rather than simply the quantity of decentralised 
resources), and following Ebel and Yilmaz (2002), Meloche et al. (2004) and 
Stegarescu (2005), we propose the following indicators, on the basis of the recognised 
revenues of such governments, according to the economic classification of Spanish 
public accounts: 
 
1.  Full revenue control decentralisation (FREVCDREG): revenues over which 
the subcentral bodies may exercise their powers without restrictions, as a 
proportion of total recognised non-financial revenues. Such revenues, in the 
case of Spanish regional governments, correspond to sections 3 
(administrative fees, user charges and other revenue), 5 (income from 
business operations and property) and 6 (divestment of property 
investments). 
 
2.  Medium revenue control decentralisation (MREVCDREG): revenues over 
which the subcentral tiers enjoy, at least, the power to determine the sum or 
level of such revenues
4, as a proportion of total recognised non-financial 
                                                 
4 In the case of taxes, and following, from among many authors, Bird (1993), the power to determine, at 
least, the tax rate. 
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revenues correspond to sections 3, 5 and 6 and part of sections 1 (direct 
taxes) and 2 (indirect taxes). However, it was not until 1997 that such 
governments acquired regulatory authority over direct ceded taxes
5 and some 
indirect ceded taxes
6. With the exception of Navarre and the Basque Country 
(to be precise, its "Foral Deputations"), which, due to the special system of 
financing applied to them, have possessed wide-ranging regulatory authority 
over the cited direct and indirect taxes since the beginning of the process of 
fiscal decentralisation. Thus, for the construction of this indicator, as far as 
the ACs with ordinary financing systems are concerned, sections 3, 5 and 6 
must be included since the beginning of such process and, from 1997 
onwards, so must all of section 1 and the ITP (Property Tax) and IAJD 
(Stamp Duty) of section 2. While for Navarra and the Basque Country, this 
same inclusion, referring to sections 1 and 2, must be performed from the 
beginning, together with sections 3, 5 and 6. 
 
3.  Low revenue control decentralisation (LREVCDREG): revenues which the 
regional tiers receive, at least, under the formula of participation
7, as a 
proportion of total recognised non-financial rights. In the Spanish case, such 
revenues correspond to sections 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6. Thus, in order to construct 
this indicator, for all the ACs, the totality of the revenues listed in those five 
sections must be considered from the beginning of the process of fiscal 
decentralisation. 
 
These indicators (which will be our variables of interest in the analysis we shall 
subsequently perform of the possible existence of a relationship between the 
decentralisation of revenue and the economic growth of the ACs) may be calculated 
using the information included in the Spanish Public Sector Database (BADESPE)
8 
from 1984 until today; information regarding their construction is described in Table 
1. 
                                                 
5 Personal Income Tax (IRPF), Inheritance and Gift Tax (ISD) and Wealth Tax (IP). 
6 Basically, the Property Transfer Tax (ITP) and Stamp Duty (IAJD). 
7 That is to say, conditional and unconditional grants are excluded. 
8 Compiled by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IEF), and the only database which offers detailed budgetary 
information for the various levels of government which exist in Spain. 
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Table 1. Indicators of revenue decentralisation for the case of the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities 
 
REVENUE DECENTRALISATION  S 
FULL MEDIUM LOW 
DESCRIPTION 
FCREVDREG: 
Revenues of the ACs, 
recognised in sections 3, 
5 and 6, as a proportion 
of total recognised non-
financial revenues, in 
accordance with the 
economic classification. 
MCREVDREG: 
Revenues of the ACs 
recognised in sections 3, 
5 and 6 and in sections 1 
and 2 (only ITP and 
IAJD), from 1997 
onwards, for ACs with 
the standard system of 
financing and for the 
complete period for 
those employing the 
special system, as a 
proportion of total 
recognised non-financial 
revenues, in accordance 
with the economic 
classification.  
LCREVDREG: 
Revenues of the ACs 
recognised in sections 1, 
2, 3, 5 and 6 as a 
proportion of total 
recognised non-financial 
revenues, in accordance 
with the economic 
classification.  
 
3. ECONOMETRIC  SPECIFICATION AND VARIABLES FOR THE 
ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REVENUE 
DECENTRALISATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE SPANISH 
AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES  
 
3. 1. Econometric specification 
 
As stated in the introduction, very few previous studies have analysed the 
relationship between tax decentralisation and economic growth at the subcentral level. 
Our study, following the approach generally employed in such studies, such as Akai and 
Sakata (2002) for the North American states or Jin and Zou (2005) for the Chinese 
provinces, will evaluate the possible relationship between revenue decentralisation and 
economic growth in the Spanish ACs in the period 1984-1995, using the following 
linear approximation: 
 
Yit = αi + βi’ Xit + λt + εit; with εit ∼ I.I.D. (0, σε
2)     (1) 
 
  10 where Yit is the rate of growth of GDP per capita of the Autonomous Community 
i in the period t, αi is a term which represents the specific unobservable factors of each 
individual, βi’ and Xit are matrices 1 * H y H * 1 which represent, respectively, the 
coefficients and the h explanatory variables. The latter are comprised of a series of 
control variables and our variable of interest i.e. the different indicators of revenue 
decentralisation. λt is a term which represents the specific factors of each time period 
and, lastly, εit is the error term. 
 
The fact that the time period under consideration is limited to 1984-1995 is due 
to the difficulty of linking the data from the Spanish Regional Accounts (Contabilidad 
Regional de España-CRE) obtained from the National Statistics Institute (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística-INE) until 1995, according to the European System of Accounts 
of 1979 (ESA-79), with the data obtained from then onwards, in accordance with the 
new European System of Accounts of 1995 (ESA-95). 
 
3. 2. Dependent variable and explanatory variables  
 
We shall measure the rate of growth of GDP per capita of each Autonomous 
Community as the variation in the logarithm of that variable. In this calculation, the data 
for GDP, at constant 1986 prices, and those for population have been taken, 
respectively, from the CRE and the “Spanish Population Evolution” compiled by the 
INE. 
 
The control variables we shall consider are those commonly used in the 
literature regarding economic growth, when working with a data panel i.e.: initial level 
of GDP per capita, rate of investment, variation in human capital and population growth 
in each of the ACs
9. 
 
The initial level of GDP per capita (GDPPCINI) is measured as the logarithm of 
GDP per capita in the previous year, at constant 1986 prices. Economic theory states 
that this variable negatively affects economic growth, as a consequence of the 
convergence processes occurring within a group of economies. 
                                                 
9 The first of these is intended to represent the conditional process of β convergence and the remaining 
ones follow the broadening of Solow's model (1956) proposed by Mankiw et al. (1992). 
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With respect to the rate of investment, we shall distinguish between private 
(PRVINVR) and public (PUBINVR) investment. The private investment rate is 
measured as the quotient between Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) of a 
productive nature
10 and the GDP of the Autonomous Community, with both magnitudes 
given in constant 1986 prices. For the first magnitude, we employ the data supplied in 
studies by the Valencian Institute of Economic Research (IVIE) for the BBVA 
Foundation (FBBVA); for the second, the data are once more taken from the INE. The 
rate of public investment, however, is measured as the quotient between public GFCF at 
constant 1986 prices, and the population of the Autonomous Community
11. In this case, 
the sources for the first and second magnitude are once again the research performed by 
the IVIE for the FBBVA and the INE, respectively. It is to be expected that, in 
accordance with the literature, these variables positively affect the economic growth of 
the Spanish ACs. Nevertheless, with regard to public investment, it must be 
remembered, as Barro (1990) states, that this has two distinct effects upon growth; one 
is positive, derived from its utilisation as a factor in private production, while the other 
is negative, due to the need to finance it by taxes, which necessarily affects capital 
accumulation in the economy. 
 
The variation in human capital (DLHK), in accordance with the usual 
approximation, is obtained as the variation in the logarithm of the proportion of the 
employed population in the Autonomous Community with, at least, secondary 
education. This information is extracted from the human capital database compiled by 
the IVIE for the Bancaja Foundation. The literature appears to identify a positive effect 
of this variable upon economic growth. 
 
Population growth (DLPOP) is calculated as the variation in the logarithm of the 
total population of the Autonomous Community from January 1 of the year in question 
to January 1 of the following year, as given in the “Spanish Population Evolution” data 
                                                 
10 That is to say, excluding residential property. 
11 The idea underlying this method of measuring the rate of public investment is that this is not principally 
aimed at the productive sector of an economy, but instead at the population as a whole. This argument is 
even more logical in a context of public investment of a redistributive nature, such as that which appears 
to have occurred in Spain in the period we analyse. Within the literature concerned with the possible 
effect of fiscal decentralisation upon economic growth at subcentral level, the use, as a control variable, 
of investment weighted by the population may be seen, for example, in Lin and Liu (2000). 
  12 compiled by the INE. The theory of economic growth holds that this variable should 
have a negative effect upon it.  
 
Table 2 offers information regarding the dependent variable and the control 
variables. 
 
Table 2. Dependent variable and control variables for the study of the relationship 
between decentralisation of revenue and economic growth of the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities 
 
NAME DESCRIPTION  SOURCE 
DLGDPPC  Variation in the 
logarithm of GDP  
CRE and “Spanish 




Logarithm of GDP per 
capita in the previous 
year 
CRE and “Spanish 
Population Evolution” – 
INE 
– 
PRVINVR  Private GFCF in relation 
to GDP 
IVIE – FBBVA and 
CRE – INE  + 
PUBINVR  Public GFCF in relation 
to population 
IVIE – FBBVA and 
“Spanish Population 
Evolution” – INE  
+ / –  
DLHK 
Variation in the 
logarithm of the 
proportion of employed 
population with, at least, 
secondary education  
IVIE – Bancaja 
Foundation  + 
DLPOP 
Variation in the 
logarithm of the 
population from January 
1 of the year in question 
to January 1 of the 
following year  
“Spanish Population 
Evolution” – INE   − 
 
Lastly, our variable of interest, the decentralisation of revenue, will be 
represented by the three indicators described in the previous section and presented in 
Table 1: Full revenue control decentralisation (FREVCDREG), medium revenue control 
decentralisation (MREVCDREG) and low revenue control decentralisation 
(LREVCDREG), constructed on the basis of the information provided by the Spanish 
Public Sector Database (BADESPE) of the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IEF). 
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4.  PRINCIPAL RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN DECENTRALISATION OF REVENUE AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN THE SPANISH AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES  
 
4. 1. Econometric questions 
 
As Hsiao (2003) states, the combination of the time and spatial dimensions via 
the panel data approach allows the number of observations to be raised, thereby 
increasing the degrees of liberty and reducing the multicolinearity between the 
explanatory variables, while producing an improvement in the efficiency of the 
econometric estimations. Thus, the study of long-term relationships may be undertaken 
with greater confidence through panel regressions. This is one of the reasons we 
estimate the possible relationship between the decentralisation of revenue and regional 
economic growth in Spain by using a data panel for the 17 Autonomous Communities 
and the period 1984-1995 (N = 17 and T = 12, and therefore, initially, the number of 
observations will be 204). 
 
However, panel regressions based on a frequency of annual data, as in our case, 
may be conditioned by short-term movements, as Thiessen (2003) observes, or by 
fluctuations in the economic cycle, as Woller and Phillips (1998) show, in their studies 
of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth. Consequently, 
Thiessen (2003), concentrates his analysis solely on the results obtained from cross-
section estimations for a group of countries, in order to identify, principally, the long-
term effects. Nevertheless, as the literature has repeatedly demonstrated, there is a more 
satisfactory way of confronting this problem, namely by controlling for these time 
factors in our regressions. 
 
On the same point, we should emphasise another of the advantages of the 
standard techniques of panel data is the possibility of controlling for the effect of 
specific factors in each Autonomous Community, which are extremely difficult to 
quantify
12. This is achieved by specifying individual effects, different for each region 
                                                 
12 It should be noted, following Islam (1995), Baltagi (2001) or Hsiao (2003), that the omission of these 
factors when proposing a model has potentially very negative effects upon the quality of the estimations. 
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factors upon the economic growth of each AC. Additionally, time effects may be 
proposed, in order to represent those changes over time which also affect such economic 
growth. 
 
With regard to the specification which we proposed in (1), two possible methods 
of estimation exist. On the one hand, to consider that the individual and time effects 
may be understood to be fixed and to include them in the model as variables; on the 
other, to consider that such effects may be understood to be random and to make them 
form part of the structure of the error term
13. Consequently, the procedure we shall 
employ will be to estimate the different models we propose by a typical regression of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), a fixed effects regression and a random effects 
regression, the latter through a Generalised Least Squares (GLS) regression. 
Subsequently, we shall employ a series of statistical tests, in order to determine which is 
the most appropriate model. Specifically, an F-test of the joint significance of the fixed 
effects will determine whether the estimation of the model with fixed effects is better 
than the OLS estimation, and a Hausman test
14 will permit us to choose between the 
fixed effects model and the random effects model. Given that, via the F-test, the need to 
employ individual effects is confirmed in all the models we propose, it is not necessary 
to perform a Breusch-Pagan test
15, which allows us to determine if the random effects 
model is better than the OLS estimation. We notify readers in advance that in all the 
models we develop in the following two sections, the null hypothesis of absence of 
correlation of individual effects with the remaining variables can be rejected, and thus 
the fixed effects specification is the most appropriate. 
                                                                                                                                               
In fact, if such factors are correlated with the variables present in the model, and are not considered, the 
consistency of the parameters estimated is not guaranteed. On the other hand, even if they are not 
correlated with the remaining variables, if the model takes them into account in some way, the efficiency 
of such estimations is improved. 
13 It is important to observe that, in accordance with the postulates of classic econometrics, the choice 
between the fixed effects model and the random effects model will depend upon the existence of a 
correlation between the individual effects and the variables included in the model. In the presence of this 
type of correlation, the estimation of the random effects model would not be consistent; consistency 
would only be guaranteed by the fixed effects model. However, in the absence of correlation, the random 
effects model will provide more efficient estimators. 
14 The null hypothesis of which is the absence of correlation between the individual effects and the 
remaining variables present in the model. It should be noted that, as Hsiao (2003) states, estimation with 
fixed effects and estimation with random effects tend to become identical when, the number of 
individuals (N) being fixed, the number of observations (T) tends towards infinity. Thus, the application 
of the Hausman test will be all the more necessary when N is large in relative terms with regard to T, as in 
our case. 
15 The null hypothesis of which is that the variance of OLS residuals is constant. 
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It should be emphasised that a further argument in support of the fixed effects 
approach, as opposed to the random one, is that our analysis is intended to control for 
the differences which exist between the 17 Autonomous Communities which comprise 
their total population; i.e. in our analysis, the situation is not that each AC is taken 
randomly from a wider set of ACs, and thus a random effects estimation would not 
really be appropriate. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that there exists a possible problem regarding the 
endogeneity of our variables of interest, when estimating the various models we 
propose. Standard practice advises avoiding this possibility by estimating, in addition, 
the models using instrumental variables. As Martínez-Vázquez and McNab note (2003), 
it is difficult to select appropriate instruments for our variables of interest i.e. variables 
which are correlated to the decentralisation of revenue but not to economic growth and, 
in addition, for which continuous data are available. In this case, as Behnisch et al. 
(2002) or Thiessen (2003) show, it would seem more logical to assume that our 
variables of interest are exogenous than to work with instruments of uncertain 
reliability
16. Such an assumption is not difficult to make for the fiscal decentralisation 
process occurring in Spain, since the allocation of taxes and expenditure among the 
various levels of government has been determined more by historical and political 
issues than by economic development. 
 
4. 2. Regressions 
 
As we have just stated, we decided, following the performance of the relevant 
tests, to study the possible effects of fiscal decentralisation upon the economic growth 
of the Spanish ACs, in the period 1984-1995, employing a fixed effects panel. Thus, we 
shall propose three different models, one for each proposed indicator of revenue 
decentralisation with this type of effects and with control variables for initial income 
level, public and private (sector) investment rates, human capital growth and population 
                                                 
16 In fact, there exists an ever-growing body of literature which holds that estimation with instrumental 
variables produces problems which have not yet received sufficient attention and concludes that, in many 
cases, such estimation is of lower quality than that obtained by OLS, assuming the exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. The seminal studies within this literature are those of Buse (1992) and Bound et al. 
(1996). 
  16 variation, as stated above. From the first estimations performed, the different control 
variables will be significant, and thus it will not be necessary to exclude any of them 
from our models. The only one which, in this regard, displays somewhat different 
behaviour is the rate of public (sector) investment, which will be fluctuating at a 
significance level of approximately 10%. 
 
Our models are intended to capture both individual and time effects. In the latter 
case, initially, we use T-1 dummies for each of the years in the period, excluding the 
first one in order to avoid perfect multicolinearity, in line with Wooldridge (2002). 
However, these dummy variables do not prove to be significant, and thus, given that the 
period we analyse covers two completely different stages of the economic cycle 
(expansion until 1992 and economic crisis and mild recovery between 1992 and 1995), 
we decided to consider only time dummies for the latter subperiod. Despite this, such 
effects continue to be insignificant, with the exception of 1993, which is significant at 
10% with a negative sign. Consequently, in view of these results, and bearing in mind 
that these temporary dummy variables supply minimal explanatory capacity to our 
models, we decided to exclude the former from the estimation of the latter. 
 
One alternative method of including changes over time in our estimations is to 
consider a time trend for the period under consideration; this, in addition, may display a 
specific slope for each Autonomous Community. Consequently, we capture additional 
sources of heterogeneity among the regions, as it would seem reasonable to assume that 
certain aspects which are characteristic of each of them vary over the period considered. 
The equation to be estimated would be the following:  
 
Yit = αi + βi’ Xit + t + γit + εit; with εit ~ I.I.D. (0, σε
2)    (2) 
 
Thus, our models include a general time trend (t) and specific time trends for 
each AC (γit). As a result, we find, on the one hand, a significant and positive general 
trend is systematically displayed in the various regressions proposed; on the other, in 
some such regressions, we discover certain specific trends with a degree of significance 
and an invariably negative sign.  This is the case of the island Autonomous 
Communities (Balearic Islands and Canary Islands), the south-east coast (Valencia and 
Murcia), the home of the national capital (Madrid) and the foral regions (Navarre and 
  17 the Basque Country). Given that these last three are those in which the most 
specifications are significant, and to a greater degree, they shall be the only ones 
considered in our models, together with the general trend. 
 
Another factor we have taken into account when estimating these models is the 
existence of different financing systems among the 17 ACs
17, in order to thereby 
determine if their economic growth was affecting by the differences existing among 
such systems.  In addition, as must be remembered, this is a question which affects the 
construction of the various revenue decentralisation indicators we propose, particularly 
the medium revenue control decentralisation indicator. It should be noted that if revenue 
decentralisation had an important effect upon economic growth, it is reasonable to 
expect that, with regard to the medium revenue control decentralisation indicator, a 
dummy variable for the foral financing system would be significant, since the ACs 
which enjoy that system display, by definition, a much more intense medium revenue 
control decentralisation indicator. We therefore distinguish, through dummy variables, 
between the foral and standard system of financing and, within the latter, between those 
ACs regulated by Article 143 of the Spanish Constitution and those to which Article 
151 applies, with regard to their level of competencies. However, when we successively 
introduce these dummy variables into each of our three models, the former are neither 
significant nor improve the latter's' explanatory capacity
18. Consequently, we shall 
estimate these models without taking into consideration the differences which exist 
between the 17 ACs with respect to their system of financing and the powers they 
enjoy. 
 
As stated earlier, Table 3 offers the principal results we obtain in the estimation, 
using a fixed effects panel, of the relationship between the three types of revenue 
control decentralisation considered (full, medium and low) and the economic growth of 
the 17 ACs in the period 1984-1995. As can be observed, in the three models, the 
individual effects of each of the ACs are very significant. In addition, such models 
explain over one-third of the behaviour of the endogenous variable and their tests of 
joint significance of the explanatory variables are passed at the level of 1%. 
                                                 
17 This question has also been considered by Carrión-i-Silvestre et al. (2004) and Pérez and Cantarero 
(2004). 
18 Similar results are provided by Carrión-i-Silvestre et al. (2004) and Pérez and Cantarero (2004). In 
these studies only the dummy variable for the foral system is significant, with a negative sign. 
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With regard to the control variables, it can be seen that they display the expected 
signs in all the estimations and, in almost all cases, a high degree of significance. The 
exception is public (sector) investment, the effect of which upon economic growth is 
less significant that that of private (sector) investment, in line with the results obtained 
by Gorostiaga (1999), Salinas (2003) and María-Dolores and Puigcerver (2005). 
Moreover, the variation in human capital, as we define it, is scarcely significant if 
considered contemporaneously
19. Nevertheless, when we consider that the improvement 
in the skills of the employed population has a retarded effect upon economic growth
20, 
the significance of this variable increases considerably, producing models with greater 
explanatory capacity. Consequently, we include in our estimations the variation in 
human capital lagged by one period. With regard to time trends, as we have stated 
above, the general trend is very significant and positive, in the various specifications, 
while the trends for the Autonomous Community of Madrid and the foral regions are 
negative and less significant
21. However, it is important to emphasise that the 
coefficients estimated for these trends, both general and specific, are of an extremely 
low magnitude. 
 
Our variables of interest (i.e. the various revenue decentralisation indicators) 
display positive but not significant signs, with the exception of the low revenue control 
decentralisation indicator, which is significant at 10%. Although the study periods are 
different, it should be underlined that the positive sign of the coefficients coincides with 
that obtained by Carrión-i-Silvestre et al. (2004), regarding a traditional revenue 
decentralisation indicator, for which, additionally, the estimated coefficient is 
significant. Moreover, the low significance of the estimated coefficients is in line with 
the results obtained by Pérez and Cantarero (2004), who found almost no significant 
relationship between their revenue decentralisation indicator, constructed in a traditional 
fashion, and the economic growth of the ACs in the period 1992-1999. With regard to 
the studies concerned with the relationship between revenue decentralisation and 
economic growth in the context of subcentral governments in other countries, it is 
                                                 
19 In contrast to Carrión-i-Silvestre et al. (2004), where the variation in human capital, approximated in 
the same way, is positive and highly significant. 
20 This idea is widely accepted in the literature, as shown by Durlauf et al. (2004). From among the 
studies concerned with the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth see, for 
example, Akai and Sakata (2002) and Akai et al. (2004). 
21 We shall return to some of these results below. 
  19 interesting to note that the positive result of our estimations coincides with that obtained 
for the Indian states by Zhang and Zou (2001), in which the usual revenue 
decentralisation ratio is utilised, and with those provided by Lin and Liu (2000) for the 
Chinese provinces and Freinkman and Yossifov (1999) and Desai et al. (2003) for the 
Russian regions, in which the indicator employed is the rate of withholding of the 
revenue collected by the subcentral government. 
 
Two additional aspects should be emphasised in our results. Firstly, the lower 
the level of intensity of revenue control decentralisation we wish to measure i.e. moving 
from full to medium or from medium to low, the greater is the degree of significance of 
the indicator. Secondly, the estimated coefficient with the greatest magnitude is that of 
the indicator of medium revenue control decentralisation, which is, approximately, 
twice that estimated for the other two indicators. 
 
Thus, our results would appear to indicate that the decentralisation of revenue to 
the Spanish ACs in the period 1984-1995 had only a mild direct effect upon economic 
growth, and that the increased control which the ACs may have had over their revenue 
was not relevant to this effect, in contrast to the results obtained by Ebel and Yilmaz 
(2002) and Meloche et al. (2004) for a series of countries with transition economies. 
Therefore, in the period studied, the only effect which revenue decentralisation directly 
exerted upon the economic growth of the ACs was that caused by the volume of 
revenue transferred (hence the significance of the coefficient estimated for the low 
revenue control decentralisation)
22, and not that produced by the degree of control 
exerted over such revenue, since this was negligible for the ACs with standard system 
of financing. 
 
Lastly, we would like to stress that we have studied the possibility that the 
relationship between the decentralisation of revenue and the economic growth of the 
ACs has a non-linear character; consequently we included in each of the regressions, as 
                                                 
22 It should be noted that this indicator principally represents revenue over which no regulatory capacity 
whatsoever is possessed. Thus, it may be approximated to an standard indicator of decentralisation 
expenditure, which would permit us to talk of a positive and significant effect of the decentralisation of 
expenditure to the ACs in the period 1984-1995, in line with the results produced by Carrión-i-Silvestre et 
al. (2004). 
  20 an additional factor, the square of the revenue decentralisation indicator in question, but 
this in no case produced significant estimated coefficients. 
 
4.3. The indirect effect of revenue decentralisation upon economic growth 
through private (sector) investment  
 
Having studied the direct relationship which exists between the decentralisation 
of revenue to the ACs and their economic growth in the period 1984-1995, it is 
interesting to conjecture whether, in this context, it is possible to validate some of the 
principal results obtained by the theoretical model for revenue decentralisation and 
economic growth we proposed in Gil-Serrate and López-Laborda  (2005) and, 
specifically, the fact that, according to that model, there exists a relationship between 
the low productivity of public (sector) investment and a positive effect of the 
decentralisation of revenue to subcentral levels upon economic growth. This effect 
would be channelled through private (sector) investment, as a consequence of the 
"flypaper effect" which accompanies the decentralisation process. We are talking, 
therefore, of an indirect effect of revenue decentralisation upon economic growth, 
through private (sector) investment. 
 
In the estimations performed in the previous section, we obtained not only a 
positive and significant effect of private investment upon regional economic growth, but 
also a positive effect, although considerably lower and hardly significant, of public 
(sector) investment upon such growth. This scenario would be compatible with the 
framework which, according to our model, would have to be provided for there to exist 
the above-mentioned indirect effect of revenue decentralisation upon economic growth, 
since private (sector) investment has a clear and positive effect upon economic growth 
and, moreover, public (sector) investment appears to be considerably less productive 
than its private counterpart. Thus, in line with Barro (1990), once a certain (relatively 
low) level of public (sector) investment is reached, its positive effects upon growth (as a 
consequence of its complementarity with private (sector) investment), does not 
compensate for the detrimental effects produced by the tax burden necessary to finance 
it; that is to say, once this level has been surpassed, a process of revenue 
decentralisation to the subcentral levels would have a positive effect upon economic 
  21 growth, since it would free resources from the public to the private sector, via the 
"flypaper effect" which accompanies such process.  
 
In order to completely validate our theoretical results we need to estimate a 
model capable of explaining the private (sector) investment undertaken in the ACs in 
the period 1984-1995, using our revenue decentralisation indicators and a series of 
control variables, paying attention to the sign and significance of the coefficients 
obtained for those indicators. Our dependent variable will, therefore, be private (sector) 
investment (PRVINVR) and the control variables to be considered will be some of those 
normally employed in equations which are intended to explain investment using fiscal 
decentralisation as the variable of interest
23, namely inflation (INFL) and the 
unemployment rate (UNEMPR), lagged by one period to include the cyclical effects. 
The first of these shall be measured as the annual variation in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) of the Autonomous Community in question, data we take from the INE, and it is 
to be expected that it has a negative effect on private investment. The second is 
extracted from the Active Population Survey (EPA, in its Spanish initials), performed 
by the INE, and it will also presumably have a negative effect upon private investment. 
 
When estimating the three models which result from considering each of the 
revenue decentralisation indicators with which we are working, we employed the same 
approach as that described in the previous section. That is to say, we propose a fixed 
effects model in which we have controlled for changes over time by including both a 
general time trend and time trends specific to each AC. The former proves to be positive 
and significant in all the estimations; in the latter, the same ACs as in the study of the 
relationship between revenue decentralisation and economic growth are once more 
prominent (i.e. the Autonomous Communities of the Balearic Islands, the Canary 
Islands, Valencia, Murcia, Madrid, Navarre and the Basque Country). However, given 
that the time trends for the first four of these do not attain, normally, a level of 
significance of 10%, we only consider the time trends for the remaining three. 
Furthermore, the dummy variables for the different systems of financing of the ACs, 
namely foral and standard, distinguishing within the latter between those regulated by 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Thiessen (2000 and 2003). 
  22 Article 143 and Article 151, respectively, of the Constitution, do not prove to be 
significant. 
 
In Table 4 we present the principal results obtained in the estimation, utilising a 
fixed effects panel, of the effect which the three types of revenue control 
decentralisation considered (full, medium and low) had upon the behaviour of private 
(sector) investment in the period 1984-1995. In the three models estimated, the 
individual effects of each of the ACs are very significant. Additionally, these models 
have an explanatory capacity of close to 40% and their tests of joint significance of the 
explanatory variables are passed at the level of 1%. 
 
The control variables display the expected sign and a high significance level. 
Given that inflation lagged by one period presents an estimated coefficient which, 
although it has a negative sign, is less significant than that obtained when its 
contemporary value is considered in our models, we have selected the latter option 
concerning this control variable; consequently, the explanatory capacity of the model 
has improved. With regard to the time trends, the general trend is positive and very 
significant, which indicates that, during the study period, over time, the average rate of 
private investment for the ACs as a whole tended to increase. The specific time trend for 
the foral region of Navarre is also positive and very significant. By contrast, the time 
trends associated with the Autonomous Communities of Madrid and the Basque 
Country present lower significance, the former having a positive sign and the latter a 
negative one. 
 
The negative sign associated with the specific time trend for the Basque Country 
implies that in this Autonomous Community, in the period 1984-1995, over time, and 
apart from the effects controlled by the remaining variables, the rate of private (sector) 
investment decreased. This may be explained as one of the consequences of the deep 
industrial crisis which began in this region in the late 1970s and was particularly 
pronounced in the first half of the 1980s. Thus, the coefficient estimated in the previous 
section for the time trend specific to the Basque Country, in the models by which we 
attempt to explain the economic growth of the ACs in the period 1984-1995, and which 
proved to be negative and significant, would seem to be explained by the reduction in 
the levels of private (sector) investment (basically industrial) in the Basque Country. 
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With regard to the effects of the various revenue decentralisation indicators, the 
coefficients estimated for full and medium revenue control decentralisation are positive, 
very significant and display a similar magnitude. By contrast, although the low revenue 
control decentralisation indicator presents a positive estimated coefficient, this is by no 
means significant and has a much lower magnitude. These estimations validate the 
scenario derived from the theoretical model proposed in Gil-Serrate and López-Laborda 
(2005), with regard to the positive effect upon economic growth, through private 
(sector)  investment, exerted by the decentralised revenue over which subcentral 
governments possess some regulatory capacity. This explains why the coefficients 
estimated for the indicators of full and medium revenue control decentralisation are 
positive and significant, and not, by contrast, that estimated for the low revenue control 
decentralisation coefficient, the magnitude of which is much lower, moreover, as we 
stated earlier. 
 
5.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
From the results presented in the previous section it may be deduced that the low 
regulatory capacity which Spanish regional governments had over their revenue in the 
period 1984-1995 would not have been sufficient for the Decentralisation Theorem to 
have been fulfilled in the dynamic context of their economic growth, in line with Oates 
(1993) and, therefore, for that regulatory capacity to have had a significant effect upon 
such growth. By contrast, however, the existent regulatory capacity would have been 
sufficient to have stimulated private (sector) investment, as stated in the theoretical 
model proposed in Gil-Serrate and López-Laborda  (2005) and, through such 
investment, to have had an indirect and positive effect upon Spanish regional economic 
growth. 
 
Finally, we would like to underline  how useful it would have been to have had 
available homogenous data which would have allowed the study period to have been 
extended until present. It should be noted that, from 1997 onwards, significant progress 
has been made in the regulatory capacity of the Spanish ACs, which, from among the 
indicators proposed is reflected in the evolution of the indicator of medium revenue 
  24 control decentralisation
24. If it had been possible to have included in the panel this 
increase in regulatory capacity, a feasible result would have been an estimated 
coefficient for the indicator of medium revenue control decentralisation which was 
positive and significant in the regression on regional growth. In fact, it may be observed 
in Table 3 that the estimated coefficient for this indicator in the period 1984-1995 was 
already that with the greatest magnitude, positive and close to being significant at 10%. 
This result allows us to talk not only of an indirect effect of revenue decentralisation 
upon Spanish regional economic growth, but also of a direct effect, in which, moreover, 
the degree of control which regional governments have over such revenue would be 
important. 
                                                 
24 Moreover, the extension of the study period would have allowed us to place the economic crisis of the 
1990s in better perspective, instead of occupying a central position in the period, as occurred between  
1984 and 1995, which may be conditioning some of our results. 
  25 Table 3. Estimated coefficients for the effects of revenue decentralisation upon 
economic growth in the Spanish Autonomous Communities (1984-1995) 
 
Dependent variable: DLGDPPC 

































































FREVCDREG  0.034 
(0.505) 
  
MREVCDREG   0.080 
(1.229) 
 
LREVCDREG     0.044* 
(1.881) 
ANDALUSIA  0.431 (5.321)***  0.428 (5.284)***  0.430 (5.442)*** 
ARAGON  0.539 (5.083)***  0.529 (4.997)***  0.524 (5.174)*** 
ASTURIAS  0.470 (4.998)***  0.461 (4.912)***  0.457 (5.083)*** 
BALEARIC ISLANDS  0.637 (5.236)***  0.632 (5.195)***  0.617 (5.314)*** 
CANARY ISLANDS  0.507 (5.230)***  0.502 (5.183)***  0.496 (5.332)*** 
CANTABRIA  0.499 (5.114)***  0.493 (5.066)***  0.487 (5.184)*** 
CASTILE – LEÓN  0.471 (5.030)***  0.464 (4.962)***  0.460 (5.118)*** 
CASTILE – MAN.  0.443 (5.117)***  0.439 (5.073)***  0.438 (5.212)*** 
CATALONIA  0.588 (5.143)***  0.584 (5.116)***  0.581 (5.245)*** 
VALENCIA  0.523 (5.123)***  0.518 (5.084)***  0.518 (5.233)*** 
EXTREMADURA  0.363 (5.062)***  0.358 (5.004)***  0.358 (5.155)*** 
GALICIA  0.408 (4.882)***  0.405 (4.858)***  0.403 (4.968)*** 
MADRID  0.632 (5.375)***  0.621 (5.293)***  0.632 (5.486)*** 
MURCIA  0.502 (5.201)***  0.494 (5.123)***  0.491 (5.318)*** 
NAVARRE  0.608 (5.233)***  0.561 (4.682)***  0.569 (5.183)*** 
BASQUE COUNTRY  0.579 (5.025)***  0.508 (4.018)***  0.539 (4.959)*** 
LA RIOJA  0.593 (4.878)***  0.585 (4.809)***  0.581 (4.958)*** 
PROB (F): F. E.
  0.000 0.000 0.000 
PROB (HAUSMAN): 
R. E. vs .F. E.  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R
2  0.341 0.347 0.352 
PROB (F): V. A.   0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: See table 4. 
  26 Table 4. Estimated coefficients for the effects of revenue decentralisation upon 
private (sector) investment in the Spanish Autonomous Communities (1984-1995) 
 
Dependent variable: PRVINVR 















































FREVCDREG  0.129*** 
(2.963) 
  
MREVCDREG   0.115*** 
(3.137) 
 
LREVCDREG     0.016 
(0.714) 
ANDALUSIA  0.174 (9.600)***  0.174 (9.571)***  0.182 (10.126)*** 
ARAGON  0.141 (8.598)***  0.143 (8.996)***  0.164 (9.638)*** 
ASTURIAS  0.147 (7.905)***  0.149 (8.094)***  0.169 (9.184)*** 
BALEARIC ISLANDS  0.162 (11.721)***  0.163 (11.697)***  0.169 (8.248)*** 
CANARY ISLANDS  0.184 (10.659)***  0.185 (10.682)***  0.193 (9.961)*** 
CANTABRIA  0.156 (10.576)***  0.157 (10.607)***  0.168 (10.415)*** 
CASTILE – LEÓN  0.153 (9.776)***  0.154 (9.971)***  0.171 (11.029)*** 
CASTILE – MAN.  0.173 (11.965)***  0.173 (11.886)***  0.184 (12.847)*** 
CATALONIA  0.166 (10.822)***  0.167 (10.753)***  0.178 (11.451)*** 
VALENCIA  0.161 (10.637)***  0.161 (10.651)***  0.173 (11.680)*** 
EXTREMADURA  0.181 (10.153)***  0.182 (10.233)***  0.194 (11.116)*** 
GALICIA  0.164 (12.726)***  0.164 (12.582)***  0.174 (13.607)*** 
MADRID  0.113 (5.834)***  0.115 (6.061)***  0.141 (8.429)*** 
MURCIA  0.140 (8.632)***  0.141 (8.732)***  0.155 (8.470)*** 
NAVARRE  0.137 (8.755)***  0.077 (2.556)**  0.139 (5.597)*** 
BASQUE COUNTRY  0.177 (9.552)***  0.078 (1.857)*  0.173 (6.195)*** 
LA RIOJA  0.126 (7.599)***  0.128 (7.765)***  0.146 (8.498)*** 
PROB (F): F. E.
  0.000 0.000 0.000 
PROB (HAUSMAN): 
R. E. vs .F. E.  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R
2  0.390 0.389 0.365 
PROB (F): V. A.   0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: t-statistics corrected for White heteroscedasticity are in parentheses; *, (**) and [***] indicate 
significant coefficients at the 10%, (5%) and [1%] level; PROB (F): F. E. is the p-value of the F-test used 
for testing the fixed effects model against the classical regression model with no individual effects; PROB 
(HAUSMAN):R. E. vs F. E. is the p-value of the Hausman test used for testing the random effects model 
against the fixed effects model; PROB (F): V. A. is the p-value of the F-test used for testing the joint 
significance of the explanatory variables. 
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